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BY: DIANA BERRA

5 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

6 STATE OF ARIZONA, COUNTY OF YAVAPAI

7 STATE OF ARIZONA,

V1300CR201080049

8 Plaintiff,

**STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S  
MOTION TO EXCLUDE IMPROPER  
EVIDENCE FROM PRE-SENTENCE  
HEARING**

9 vs.

10 JAMES ARTHUR RAY,

**(The Honorable Warren Darrow)**

11 Defendant.  
12

13  
14 The State of Arizona, by and through Sheila Sullivan Polk, Yavapai County Attorney,  
15 hereby urges this Court to deny Defendant's "Motion to Exclude Improper Evidence from Pre-  
16 Sentence Hearing."

17 The legal authority cited by Defendant to support his argument that the State should be  
18 precluded from presenting evidence of additional aggravating factors at the pre-sentence hearing  
19 is inapplicable to non-capital cases. The statutes, the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure and  
20 applicable case law make it clear that the State may present such evidence at the upcoming pre-  
21 sentence hearing. Likewise, Defendant's attempt to preclude this Court from considering hearsay  
22 evidence that is reliable and relevant in order to show aggravating circumstances is unsupported  
23 by legal authority. As explained below, the statutes, the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure  
24 and case law all provide that this Court can consider "any reliable, relevant evidence, including  
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26

1 hearsay,” in determining additional aggravating circumstances applicable to its sentencing  
2 determination. *Rule 26.7(b), Ariz. R. Crim. P.*

3 This Response is supported by the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities.

4 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

5 **A. A presentence hearing in a non-capital case is not limited to evidence of mitigation.**

6 The purpose of a presentence hearing is to insure that the sentencing judge is fully  
7 informed as to the character of the individual to be sentenced and the circumstances of the crime.  
8 *State v. Ohta*, 114 Ariz. 489, 492, 562 P.2d 369, 372 (1977); *A.H. by Weiss v. Superior Court*,  
9 184 Ariz. 627, 630, 911 P.2d 633, 636 (App. 1996). “The trial judge has wide discretion to  
10 review a variety of sources and types of information in determining the extent of punishment.”  
11 *Id.* Indeed, Rule 26.7, Ariz. R. Crim. P., permits either party “to introduce any reliable, relevant  
12 evidence, including hearsay, in order to show aggravating or mitigating circumstances, to show  
13 why sentence should not be imposed, or to correct or amplify the pre-sentence, diagnostic or  
14 mental health reports.”

15 Defendant’s argument that the State cannot present evidence and information on  
16 additional aggravating factors for the Court’s consideration at the pre-sentence hearing is in error  
17 and not supported by the law. The plain language of Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-701(F) and  
18 Rule 26.7, Ariz. R. Crim. P., allows the State to present such evidence and information following  
19 a jury finding of an aggravating circumstance.

20 Defendant erroneously cites to *State v. Hampton*, 213 Ariz. 167, 140 P.3d 950 (2006),  
21 and *State v. Pandeli*, 215 Ariz. 514, 161 P.3d 557 (2007), to support his argument that the State  
22 should be precluded from presenting evidence of aggravating circumstances at the upcoming  
23 presentence hearing, and may only present rebuttal evidence to Defendant’s mitigation. Both  
24  
25  
26

1 *Hampton* and *Pandeli* were capital cases wherein a different set of rules and a different  
2 sentencing procedure applies. In a capital case following a determination of guilt, the case  
3 proceeds to a two-phase proceeding in front of the jury, the aggravation phase and the penalty  
4 phase, wherein the jury must determine whether to impose the death penalty. *Rule 19.1(c) and*  
5 *(d), Ariz. R. Crim. P., and A.R.S. § 13-752.* These were the procedures followed in *Hampton* and  
6 *Pandeli*. This is not a capital case and these procedures do not apply to the presentence hearing  
7 in this case.  
8

9 In this case, the jury found the State had proven the aggravating circumstance of  
10 emotional harm to each of the victims' families beyond a reasonable doubt. This is a specifically  
11 enumerated aggravating circumstance set forth in A.R.S. § 13-702(D)(9).<sup>1</sup> Arizona Revised  
12 Statute § 13-701(F) provides that, "[i]f the trier of fact finds a least one aggravating  
13 circumstance, the trial court may find by a preponderance of the evidence additional aggravating  
14 circumstances." As a result of the jury's finding and pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-701(F), this Court  
15 may now "find and consider additional factors relevant to the imposition of a sentence up to the  
16 maximum prescribed in [A.R.S. § 13-702(D)]."<sup>2</sup> In *State v. Martinez*, 210 Ariz. 578, 585, 115  
17 P.3d 618, 625 (2005), the Arizona Supreme Court makes it clear that "once a jury finds or a  
18 defendant admits a single aggravating factor, the Sixth Amendment permits the sentencing judge  
19  
20  
21

22 <sup>1</sup> In addition to the emotional harm aggravator, the jury found as an additional aggravating  
23 circumstance that Defendant was in a unique position of trust with Lizbeth Neuman. This  
24 aggravating circumstance falls under the "catch-all" provision set forth in A.R.S. § 13-702(24)  
and is not a specifically enumerated aggravating circumstance.

25 <sup>2</sup> Because the jury found only one specifically enumerated aggravating circumstance, the law  
26 provides that Defendant may not be sentenced to the substantially aggravated term set forth in  
A.R.S. § 13-702 (D). See *State v. Perrin*, 222 Ariz. 375, 378, 214 P.3d 1016, 1019 (App. 2009)  
(Trial court required to find at least two enumerated factors in order to impose a substantially  
aggravated sentence.)

1 to find and consider additional factors relevant to the imposition of a sentence up to the  
2 maximum prescribed in that statute.”

3 Although A.R.S. § 13-701(C)(24) provides that this Court can consider “any other factor  
4 that the state alleges is relevant to the defendant’s character or to the nature or circumstances of  
5 the crime;” the use of the term “allege” does not limit the authority of the trial judge, *sua sponte*,  
6 to find only those aggravating circumstances formally alleged by the prosecution. *State v.*  
7 *Marquez*, 127 Ariz. 3, 5-6, 617 P.2d 787, 789-790 (1980). As long as the Court does not impose  
8 a sentence greater than that authorized by the jury’s finding, this Court is free to consider “any  
9 reliable, relevant evidence, including hearsay,” in determining additional aggravating  
10 circumstances applicable to its sentencing determination.” *Rule 26.7(b), Ariz. R. Crim. P.*

11 **B. The law permits the State to present reliable hearsay at the hearing.**

12 As noted above, Rule 26.7, Ariz. R. Crim. P., permits either party, at the pre-sentence  
13 hearing, to introduce any reliable, relevant evidence, including hearsay, in order to show  
14 aggravating or mitigating circumstances. “What constitutes reliable or responsible hearsay is of  
15 necessity largely within the discretion of the trial court.” *State v. Donahoe*, 118 Ariz. 37, 44, 574  
16 P.2d 837 (1977). In *State v. Jones*, 147 Ariz. 353, 710 P.2d 463 (1985), the Arizona Supreme  
17 Court noted the following:  
18  
19

20 “[I]nformation” includes only those facts which are substantiated. Unarticulated  
21 thoughts, unidentified documents, and unattributed statements do not provide  
22 “information” sufficient to support a finding of aggravated circumstances.  
23 “Evidence” to be admitted for sentencing purposes is, like other evidence,  
24 governed by the rules of evidence. “Information” may be considered even though it  
25 may not meet the requirements of the evidence rules. However, the rule of common  
26 sense applies even where the rules of evidence do not. The record must show what  
the information consists of and where it comes from and must indicate that it has  
some substance above rumor, gossip or speculation.

*Id.* at 355, 710 P.2d at 465.

1 In this case, after the jury returned its guilty verdict, the State received numerous e-mails  
2 and letters from individuals personally affected by their relationship with Defendant. All of the  
3 e-mails and letters were immediately disclosed to Defendant. Detective Diskin has contacted the  
4 senders and verified that the e-mails or letters were in fact written by the identified authors and  
5 accurately represented their experience. None of the letters were sent anonymously and do not  
6 represent "unarticulated thoughts or unidentified documents." The letters have been formally  
7 disclosed along with Detective Diskin's supplemental report documenting his contact with the  
8 senders. While the State will call three of the writers to testify before this court, the State will  
9 move to admit the remainder through the testimony of Detective Diskin pursuant to Rule 26.7(b),  
10 Ariz. R. Crim. P.

12 Defendant writes in his Motion that he has never met three of the letter writers - Joshua  
13 Galle, Brooke Kirkland and Mary Latallade – and that they never attended a JRI event.

- 15 • The State agrees that this is true regarding Joshua Galle, who does not claim to have met  
16 Defendant and identifies himself as Lizbeth Neuman's nephew.
- 17 • The letter from Brooke Kirkland indicates she attended an event at the Seaside Church of  
18 Religious Science in 2007 where Defendant was the speaker. Detective Diskin will  
19 continue to try to contact her to verify this information.
- 20 • Mary Latallade attended Spiritual Warrior 2008 and there are photographs of her  
21 following the sweat lodge event in 2008. At the time, Ms. Latallade went by the name of  
22 Mary Bryson. Ms. Bryson's presence at Spiritual Warrior 2008 is also confirmed by  
23 Cynthia Manner's letter and multiple photographs admitted at trial.

25 Other than an e-mail identifying potential mitigation witnesses, the State has not received  
26 any disclosure from Defendant relating to the hearing; however, the State believes Defendant

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1 will be submitting very similar communications favorable to Defendant to this Court for  
2 consideration.

3 In determining the appropriate sentence, "[t]he Court should take into account both the  
4 crime before it and the past conduct and moral character of the defendant so that the punishment  
5 may fit the offense and the offender." *State v. Gray*, 122 Ariz. 445, 448, 595 P.2d 990, 993  
6 (1979); *State v. Shuler*, 162 Ariz. 19, 21, 780 P.2d 1067, 1069 (App. 1989). In making this  
7 determination, "the judge may consider any reliable, relevant evidence, including unsworn  
8 testimony and out-of-court statements." *State v. Johnson*, 131 Ariz. 299, 305, 640 P.2d 861, 867  
9 (1982) (citing *State v. O'Donnal*, 110 Ariz. 552, 555, 521 P.2d 984, 987 (1974). Defendant's  
10 past conduct and moral character are relevant to the determination of an appropriate sentence and  
11 the letters and statements from past participants and clients of Defendant's events should be  
12 considered by this Court in weighing the evidence of mitigation and aggravation.  
13

14 Defendant's Motion should be denied.  
15

16 RESPECTFULLY submitted this 15 day of September, 2011.  
17

18 By Sheila Sullivan Polk  
19 SHEILA SULLIVAN POLK  
20 YAVAPAI COUNTY ATTORNEY  
21  
22  
23

24 COPIES of the foregoing emailed this  
25 15<sup>th</sup> day of September, 2011:

26 Hon. Warren Darrow  
Dtroxell@courts.az.gov

COPIES of the foregoing delivered this  
15<sup>th</sup> day of September, 2011, to

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